Trust Under Pressure: Tunisia 2019 → 2026
What nationally representative probability surveys and official ballot returns reveal about confidence in executive authority, cabinet governance, public service satisfaction, youth migration intentions, and voter turnout under Kais Saied.
Executive Research Findings
A rigorous primary-source audit of nationally representative probability surveys and official electoral records establishes seven primary evidentiary conclusions regarding public confidence, governance evaluations, and social outlook in Tunisia:
In the official Arab Barometer Wave VIII report (fieldwork Sep–Nov 2023), 77% of Tunisians expressed trust in President Kais Saied (47% "great deal" + 30% "quite a lot"). This represents a decline of approximately 6 percentage points from the fall 2021 benchmark (~83%). Wave IX (2025) did not publish an identical single-item presidential trust measure (disclosed as a formal DATA GAP).
Trust in the Government (Cabinet / Kasbah) recorded 36% in Wave VIII (2023) and rebounded to 44% in Wave IX (late 2025), representing a gain of +8 percentage points. Government trust is methodologically distinct from presidential trust.
Trust in Parliament (Assembly of the Representatives of the People) rose by 13 percentage points from 9% in 2021 to 22% in Wave VIII (2023), reflecting partial recovery from pre-2021 lows despite low voter turnout.
Political interest remained depressed across consecutive waves at 24% (with 76% little or not interested). Among youth aged 18–29, interest was recorded at just 13% in Wave VIII, mirroring depressed participation in legislative (11.2%) and presidential (28.8%) elections.
46% of all adults in Wave VIII and 41% in Wave IX reported considering emigration. Among youth aged 18–29, desire to leave reached 71% in Wave VIII and 67% in Wave IX. Furthermore, 53% of young potential migrants in Wave VIII reported having begun concrete preparations to leave.
44% of Tunisians identified the economy, living costs, and unemployment as the nation's single most pressing challenge in Wave IX, far outstripping public services (18%), corruption (14%), and political governance (12%).
Methodological Distinctions & Provenance Disclosures
Public opinion analysis requires rigorous adherence to primary survey wording and demographic frameworks. 404TN establishes four core distinctions:
President ≠ Government
Presidential trust (77% in 2023) and Government trust (36% in 2023; 44% in 2025) are separate variables. Under 404TN rules, government trust cannot be substituted as a proxy for presidential confidence.
Migration Intent ≠ Preparation
In Wave VIII, 71% of youth considered emigrating, whereas 53% of that subset had begun formal preparations. Storing 53% as total intention is an error.
Service Satisfaction ≠ Trust
Satisfaction with civil defense (86%) and electricity (65%) are utility/emergency performance ratings, NOT institutional trust in the military or police.
Turnout & Denominators
Electoral turnout shifted from 55.0% in 2019 (7.07M active roll) to 28.8% in 2024 (9.75M expanded passive roll). Absolute vote totals must accompany percentages.
Trust in the President of the Republic
The official Arab Barometer Wave VIII Tunisia Country Report documents that in late 2023 (fieldwork 13 Sep – 04 Nov 2023), 77% of Tunisians expressed trust in President Kais Saied (combining 47% who expressed "a great deal of trust" and 30% who expressed "quite a lot of trust").
Arab Barometer observes that this represents approximately three-quarters of the population and reflects a modest decline of approximately 6 percentage points from the fall 2021 survey benchmark (~83%). Despite acute economic strain, confidence in the presidency remained the highest among political leadership figures.
The Arab Barometer Wave IX release (July 2026) published government trust (44%) but omitted an identical, standalone single-item measure on the President of the Republic. Under 404TN standards, this absence is classified as a formal DATA GAP. We strictly prohibit conflating cabinet confidence with presidential trust.
Trust in Government (Cabinet / Kasbah)
Trust in the Government (Cabinet / Kasbah) exhibited a distinct trajectory from presidential confidence. In the late-2023 Wave VIII survey, substantial trust in the government stood at 36% during the tenure of Prime Minister Ahmed Hachani.
In the late-2025 Wave IX survey, substantial trust in the government climbed to 44%, recording a gain of +8 percentage points. This increase coincided with cooling headline inflation (from 10.4% in early 2023 down to 5.4% in 2026) and normalized basic commodity distribution.
Institutional Governance & Public Service Delivery
The primary-source audit reconciles verified governance trust metrics with public service performance ratings:
- President of the Republic (77%): Three-quarters confidence in executive mandate.
- Government / Cabinet (36% in 2023 → 44% in 2025): Improving evaluations of administrative execution.
- Parliament / ARP (22%): Trust rose by 13 points from 2021 (9%) to 22% in 2023.
- Civil Defense Performance (86%): Citizen satisfaction with emergency services (not military institutional trust).
- Electricity Provision (65%): STEG grid performance satisfaction (not police institutional trust).
- Internet Access (61%) & Water Services (43%): Documented utility satisfaction levels in Wave VIII.
Democracy, Pluralism & Leadership Preferences
Public opinion data reveals a nuanced relationship between democratic norms and executive authority. While Tunisians broadly endorse democratic principles in the abstract, dissatisfaction with pre-2021 parliamentary fragmentation produced strong demand for executive decisiveness and tangible economic delivery.
Outcomes Over Procedure
Respondents consistently prioritize price stabilization, social welfare, and job opportunities over formal parliamentary bargaining.
Parliament at 22%
While parliamentary trust improved from 9% in 2021 to 22% in 2023, confidence in legislative bodies remains subordinate to executive authority.
Public Disengagement
High general trust in leadership coexists with deep disinterest in partisan political activity, muting organized civic mobilization.
Political Interest & Civic Engagement
Both Arab Barometer Wave VIII (2023) and Wave IX (late 2025) confirm that only 24% of adult Tunisians report being interested in politics ("interested" or "very interested"), while 76% express little or no interest.
In Wave VIII, political interest was acutely polarized by age: only 13% of youth aged 18–29 expressed political interest, compared to 29% among citizens aged 30 and older. This psychological detachment directly mirrors behavioral turnout in legislative elections (11.2%) and presidential ballots (28.8%).
Pervasive political disinterest reflects fatigue with traditional political contestation combined with a perception that formal political mechanisms do not meaningfully impact economic opportunities.
Migration Intentions & The Youth Exodus
Desire to emigrate remains at historic highs across Tunisia. In Wave VIII (late 2023), 46% of the total population and 71% of youth aged 18–29 considered emigrating. In Wave IX (late 2025), overall desire stood at 41% and youth desire at 67%.
Crucially, Wave VIII established that among young potential migrants, 53% had taken concrete steps or begun preparations to leave, demonstrating active intent rather than passive aspiration. Economic hardship, high graduate unemployment (26.6%), and purchasing power decline are overwhelmingly cited as the primary drivers.
What Tunisians Identify as the Nation's Top Problem
When asked to identify the most important challenge facing Tunisia in the Wave IX survey, 44% named the economic situation, cost of living, and unemployment.
Public services and infrastructure (including water shortages, healthcare delays, and transit breakdowns) ranked second at 18%, followed by corruption (14%) and political governance (12%).
This distribution demonstrates that citizen priorities remain anchored overwhelmingly in material daily economic conditions.
The Paradox: High Executive Trust vs Acute Economic Pessimism
A defining characteristic of post-2021 Tunisian public opinion is the coexistence of strong executive confidence (77% presidential trust in 2023) alongside intense economic pessimism (44% economy top problem) and massive youth emigration desire (71% in 2023; 67% in 2025):
1. Leadership Faith vs Systemic Skepticism
Citizens distinguish between confidence in executive personal integrity and the structural capacity of the national economy to deliver jobs and wage growth.
2. The Exit Dynamic
In the absence of robust intermediary institutions, youth seek individual economic resolution through emigration rather than domestic political contestation.
Electoral Participation & Turnout Chronology (2019–2024)
| DATE | ELECTORAL EVENT | TURNOUT | BALLOTS CAST | REGISTERED (DENOMINATOR) | DENOMINATOR FRAMEWORK | POLITICAL CONTEXT |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15 Sep 2019 | Presidential Election (Round 1) | 49% | 3,465,184 | 7,074,566 | Active voluntary voter roll | Kais Saied (18.4%) & Nabil Karoui (15.6%) advanced to runoff |
| 13 Oct 2019 | Presidential Election (Round 2) | 55% | 3,892,085 | 7,074,566 | Active voluntary voter roll | Kais Saied elected with 72.71% (2,777,931 votes) |
| 25 Jul 2022 | Constitutional Referendum | 30.5% | 2,830,094 | 9,278,541 | Automatic passive voter enrollment expanded list | New constitution adopted with 94.6% of cast votes |
| 17 Dec 2022 | Parliamentary Election (Round 1) | 11.2% | 1,025,418 | 9,136,502 | Automatic passive voter enrollment list | Uninominal non-party voting under Decree-Law 2022-55 |
| 29 Jan 2023 | Parliamentary Election (Round 2) | 11.4% | 895,002 | 7,853,447 | Run-off registered voter subset | Run-off in 131 constituencies with opposition boycott |
| 24 Dec 2023 | Local Councils / Second Chamber (R1) | 11.8% | 1,074,495 | 9,079,271 | Automatic passive voter enrollment list | National Council of Regions and Districts creation |
| 06 Oct 2024 | Presidential Election | 28.8% | 2,808,548 | 9,753,217 | Automatic passive voter enrollment list | Kais Saied re-elected with 90.7% (2,438,954 votes) |
In July 2022, ISIE enacted automatic passive voter enrollment, expanding registered electors from ~7.07M in 2019 to ~9.28M (2022) and ~9.75M (2024). Absolute votes cast for Kais Saied were 2,777,931 in 2019 (55.0% turnout) versus 2,438,954 in 2024 (28.8% turnout).
What Changed, What Stabilized & What Remains Uncertain
- Presidential Trust: Eased from ~83% in 2021 to 77% in late 2023 (-6 pts).
- Electoral Participation: Presidential turnout dropped from 55.0% (2019) to 28.8% (2024).
- Youth Emigration Intent: High at 71% in 2023 and 67% in 2025.
- Government Trust: Rebounded from 36% (2023) to 44% (2025) (+8 pts).
- Parliament Trust: Improved from 9% (2021) to 22% (2023) (+13 pts).
- Civil Defense Satisfaction: High public approval at 86%.
- Electricity Provision: Stable service satisfaction at 65%.
- 2026 Presidential Trust: Arab Barometer Wave IX omitted single-item presidential measure.
- Unmeasured Institutions: Judiciary, media, and party trust unmeasured in primary release.
- Abstention Motivation: Boycott vs apathy shares unmeasured by census counts.
Public Opinion & Institutional Accountability
Citizen Perception & Mood
Surveys capture subjective legitimacy, institutional sentiment, and personal economic expectations at a specific historical moment under face-to-face polling constraints.
Objective State Performance
Surveys do not measure audited fiscal health, exact dam reservoir levels, or foreign exchange reserve days. Those belong to primary administrative statistics documented in The Economic Record.
The 2019–2026 Mandate
Under the 2022 Constitution, executive authority is centralized in the Presidency. Public mood, institutional expectations, and youth migration desire reflect the sociopolitical environment of this mandate.
Master Survey & Public Opinion Observations (20 Observations)
| ID | TOPIC / INSTITUTION | SURVEY / WAVE | SAMPLE & MODE | AUDITED VALUE | STATUS | QUESTION & CONTEXT |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TRST-01-PRES-W8 | Presidency of the Republic PRESIDENTIAL_TRUST | Wave VIII | N=2406 Face-to-face (CAPI) |
77% | CORRECTED_R2_8_1 | "To what extent do you trust the President of the Republic?" Approximately three-quarters (77%) trust President Kais Saied; represents a ~6-point decline from fall 2021 (~83%). |
| TRST-02-PRES-2021-BENCH | Presidency of the Republic PRESIDENTIAL_TRUST | Fall 2021 Benchmark | N=2400 Face-to-face (CAPI) |
~83% | CORRECTED_R2_8_1 | "To what extent do you trust the President of the Republic?" Baseline reference cited in Wave VIII report documenting ~6-point decline to 77% in late 2023. |
| TRST-03-PRES-W9-GAP | Presidency of the Republic PRESIDENTIAL_TRUST | Wave IX | N=1023 Face-to-face |
DATA GAP | DATA_GAP | "Identical single-item presidential trust question not published in Wave IX release" Wave IX published government trust (44%) but did not include an identical standalone presidential trust variable. Prohibited from substituting government trust. |
| TRST-04-GOVT-W9 | Government (Cabinet / Kasbah) GOVERNMENT_TRUST | Wave IX | N=1023 Face-to-face |
44% | VERIFIED_PRIMARY | "To what extent do you trust the government?" Increased +8 percentage points from 36% in 2023. Explicitly measures Cabinet/Government performance, separate from the Presidency. |
| TRST-05-GOVT-W8 | Government (Cabinet / Kasbah) GOVERNMENT_TRUST | Wave VIII | N=2406 Face-to-face (CAPI) |
36% | VERIFIED_PRIMARY | "To what extent do you trust the government?" Baseline cabinet trust during prime ministership of Ahmed Hachani. |
| TRST-06-PARL-W8 | Parliament (ARP) PARLIAMENT_TRUST | Wave VIII | N=2406 Face-to-face (CAPI) |
22% | CORRECTED_R2_8_1 | "To what extent do you trust parliament?" Rose by +13 percentage points from 2021 (9%) to 22% in 2023 under the new Assembly of the Representatives of the People. |
| TRST-07-POL-INT-W8 | National Public POLITICAL_INTEREST | Wave VIII | N=2406 Face-to-face (CAPI) |
24% | CORRECTED_R2_8_1 | "How interested are you in politics?" Only 24% overall interested in politics; acute disengagement among youth aged 18–29 (only 13% interested). |
| TRST-08-POL-INT-W9 | National Public POLITICAL_INTEREST | Wave IX | N=1023 Face-to-face |
24% | VERIFIED_PRIMARY | "How interested are you in politics?" Political interest remained flat at 24% population-wide, aligning with low voter turnout in legislative and presidential ballots. |
| TRST-09-MIG-TOT-W8 | Total Adult Population MIGRATION_INTENTION | Wave VIII | N=2406 Face-to-face (CAPI) |
46% | CORRECTED_R2_8_1 | "Have you ever considered emigrating from Tunisia?" 46% of all adult Tunisians reported considering emigration in late 2023. |
| TRST-10-MIG-YOUTH-W8 | Youth Cohort (18–29) MIGRATION_INTENTION | Wave VIII | N=2406 Face-to-face (CAPI) |
71% | CORRECTED_R2_8_1 | "Have you ever considered emigrating from Tunisia?" Nearly three out of four youth (71%) considered emigrating in Wave VIII. |
| TRST-11-MIG-PREP-YOUTH-W8 | Potential Youth Migrants MIGRATION_PREPARATION | Wave VIII | N=2406 Face-to-face (CAPI) |
53% of potential youth migrants | CORRECTED_R2_8_1 | "Have you taken concrete steps / begun preparations to leave?" Methodological disambiguation: 53% represents the preparation rate among young potential migrants, not total youth intention (which is 71%). |
| TRST-12-MIG-TOT-W9 | Total Adult Population MIGRATION_INTENTION | Wave IX | N=1023 Face-to-face |
41% | VERIFIED_PRIMARY | "Do you desire/intend to emigrate from Tunisia?" 41% of adult population express emigration desire in late 2025. |
| TRST-13-MIG-YOUTH-W9 | Youth Cohort (18–29) MIGRATION_INTENTION | Wave IX | N=1023 Face-to-face |
67% | VERIFIED_PRIMARY | "Do you desire/intend to emigrate from Tunisia?" Two out of three youth (67%) express intention to leave in Wave IX. |
| TRST-14-TOP-CHALLENGE-W9 | National Public NATIONAL_PRIORITIES | Wave IX | N=1023 Face-to-face |
44% | VERIFIED_PRIMARY | "What is the most important challenge facing Tunisia today?" Economy dominates public concern (44%), followed by public services (18%), corruption (14%), and political situation (12%). |
| TRST-15-SRV-CIVIL-DEFENSE-W8 | Civil Defense & Emergency Services PUBLIC_SERVICE_PERFORMANCE | Wave VIII | N=2406 Face-to-face (CAPI) |
86% | CORRECTED_R2_8_1 | "How satisfied are you with civil defense / emergency services?" Disambiguation: 86% measures citizen satisfaction with civil defense emergency services, NOT military institutional trust. |
| TRST-16-SRV-ELECTRICITY-W8 | Electricity Utility (STEG) PUBLIC_SERVICE_PERFORMANCE | Wave VIII | N=2406 Face-to-face (CAPI) |
65% | CORRECTED_R2_8_1 | "How satisfied are you with electricity provision?" Disambiguation: 65% measures electricity provision satisfaction, NOT police institutional trust. |
| TRST-17-TURNOUT-2019P-R2 | Electorate ELECTORAL_PARTICIPATION | Official Election | N=7074566 Census (Polling Stations) |
55.0% | VERIFIED_PRIMARY | "Official ISIE Ballot Count (Presidential Election Round 2)" Active voluntary voter registration system. Kais Saied won 72.71% (2,777,931 votes) in a competitive second round against Nabil Karoui. |
| TRST-18-TURNOUT-2022-REF | Electorate ELECTORAL_PARTICIPATION | Official Referendum | N=9278541 Census (Polling Stations) |
30.5% | VERIFIED_PRIMARY | "Official ISIE Ballot Count (Constitutional Referendum)" Denominator shifted: ISIE added ~2.2M eligible non-registered citizens via automatic enrollment, expanding denominator to 9.28M. Approved by 94.6% of cast votes. |
| TRST-19-TURNOUT-2022-LEG | Electorate ELECTORAL_PARTICIPATION | Official Election | N=9136502 Census (Polling Stations) |
11.2% | VERIFIED_PRIMARY | "Official ISIE Ballot Count (Legislative Round 1)" Turnout 11.22% under individual uninominal rules and unified opposition boycott. |
| TRST-20-TURNOUT-2024-PRES | Electorate ELECTORAL_PARTICIPATION | Official Election | N=9753217 Census (Polling Stations) |
28.8% | VERIFIED_PRIMARY | "Official ISIE Ballot Count (Presidential Election)" Turnout 28.79% on expanded voter rolls (9.75M). Kais Saied re-elected with 90.7% of votes cast (2,438,954 votes) amid candidate exclusions and boycotts. |
The 404TN Trust & Public Opinion dossier is anchored in probability surveys by the Arab Barometer (Wave VIII: 13 Sep – 04 Nov 2023, N=2,406, ±2.5% MoE; Wave IX: 30 Oct – 30 Nov 2025, N=1,023, ±3.0% MoE) and official census ballot returns published by the Instance Supérieure Indépendante pour les Élections (ISIE). Disclosed data gaps indicate absence of comparable survey items. All research is conducted under the 404TN strict provenance protocol with zero assumed causation.